Secure Function Evaluation (SFE) protocols are very hard to design, and reducibility has been recognized as a highly desirable property of SFE protocols. Informally speaking, reducibility (a.k.a. modular composition) is the automatic ability to break up the design of a complex SFE protocols into several simpler, individually secure components. Despite much effort, only the most basic type of reducibility, sequential reducibility (where only a single sub-protocol can be run at a time), has been considered and proven to hold for a specific class of SFE protocols. Unfortunately, sequential reducibility does not allow one to save on the number of rounds (often the most expensive resource in a distributed setting), and achieving more general notions is not easy (indeed, certain SFE notions provably enjoy sequential reducibility, but fail to enjoy more general ones).
Introduction

Our Results
In this paper, we put forward the notion of parallel reducibility and prove which SFE protocols satisfy it. We actually distinguish two forms of parallel reducibility:
Concurrent reducibility.
This type of reducibility applies when, in the semi-ideal model, the can be executed in any order. The goal of concurrent reducibility is improving the round-complexity of modularly designed SFE protocols.
Synchronous reducibility.
This type of reducibility applies when, in the semi-ideal model, the must be executed "simultaneously." The goal of synchronous reducibility is enlarging the class of modularly designable SFE protocols (while being round-efficient as well).
Concurrent Reducibility
There are many ways to execute several programs at a time. Each such way is called an interleaving. The sequential executions of are examples of interleavings. But they are very special and "very few," because interleavings may occur at a round-level. For instance, we could execute the 's one round at a time in a round-robin manner, or we could execute in single round the -th round (if any) of all the 's. Saying that programs are concurrently executable means that some specified goal is achieved for all of their interleavings.
Assume now that a function is securely evaluated by a semi-ideal protocol which, in a set of contiguous instructions, only makes ideal calls to functions , and let be a SFE protocol for (in the real model). Then, a fundamental question arise:
Will substituting each with yield a (real-model) SFE protocol for in which the 's are concurrently executable?
Of course, if calls on inputs that include an output of , we cannot hope that the 's are concurrently executable. Thus, to make sense of the question, all the inputs to 's should be determined before any of them is ideally evaluated. Moreover, even if all 's are evaluated on completely unrelated and "independent" inputs, may be secure only for some orders of the 's, but not for others, which is illustrated by the following example.
Example 1: Let be the coin-flipping function (takes no inputs and outputs a joint random bit), be a coin-flipping function as well, and be the majority function on bits. Let be the following semi-ideal protocol. Each player locally flips a random bit . Then the players "concurrently" use ideal calls to and , getting answers and respectively. The common output of is . We claim that is secure if we first call (the majority) and then (the coin-flip), but insecure if we do it the other way around. Indeed, irrespective of which we get in the first ordering, since is random (and independent of ), then so is . On the other hand, assume we first learn the random bit and assume faulty players want the bias the resulting coin-flip to . Then faulty players pretend that their (supposedly random) inputs for the majority are all equal to . This is very likely to bias the outcome of majority to as well (provided there are enough faulty players), making the coin-flip equal to with high probability.
Clearly, in the case of the above example, we cannot hope to execute the 's concurrently: one of the possible interleavings is the one that sequentially executes the 's in the order that is insecure even in the semi-ideal model. Thus, the example illustrates that the following condition is necessary for the concurrent execution of the 's.
Condition 1:
is secure in the semi-ideal model for any order of the 's.
Is the above necessary condition also sufficient? Of course, the answer also depends on the type of SFE notion we are using. But, if the answer were YES, then we would get the "strongest possible form of concurrent reducibility." Let us then be optimistic and put forward the following informal definition.
Definition 1:
We say that a SFE notion satisfies concurrent reducibility if, whenever the protocols satisfy this SFE notion, Condition 1 is (both necessary and) sufficient.
Our optimism is justified in view of the following
Theorem 1:
The SFE notion of Micali and Rogaway [22] satisfies concurrent reducibility.
We note that we have been unable to prove an analogous theorem for all other more liberal notions of SFE, and we conjecture that no such theorem exist. In support of our conjecture, we shall point out in Section 4.3 which stricter properties of the definition of [22] seem to be essential in establishing Theorem 1.
The importance of establishing (as in Theorem 1) the existence of SFE notions satisfying concurrent reducibility arises from the efficiency gains of concurrent reducibility, as expressed by the following immediate Corollary of Definition 1.
Corollary 1:
Assume satisfy Condition 1, is a protocol for taking rounds, and are SFE protocols according to a SFE notion satisfying concurrent reducibility. Then, there is a (real model) SFE implementation of executing all the 's in rounds.
This number of rounds is the smallest one can hope for, and should be contrasted with , the number of rounds required by sequential reducibility.
Synchronous Reducibility
The need to execute several protocols in parallel does not necessarily arise from efficiency considerations or from the fact that it is nice not to worry about the order of the execution. A special type of parallel execution, synchronous execution, is needed for correctness itself.
Example 2:
Let be the coin-flipping function that returns a random bit to the first two players, and , of a possibly larger network. That is, , where is a random bit (and is the empty string). Consider now the following coin-flipping protocol .
randomly and secretly selects a bit , randomly and secretly selects a bit , and then and "exchange" their selected bits and both output . Clearly, is a secure function evaluation of only if the exchange of and is "simultaneous", that is, learns only after it declares and vice versa. This requirement can be modeled as the parallel composition of two sending protocols: and . That is, we can envisage a semi-ideal protocol in which players and locally flip coins and , then simultaneously evaluate and , and finally exclusive OR their outputs of and . However, no sequential order of the ideal calls to and would result in a secure coin-flipping protocol, so the need for a special type of parallel composition is motivated by security rather than efficiency considerations.
The ability to evaluate several functions synchronously is very natural to define in the ideal model: the players simultaneously give all their inputs to the trusted party, who then gives them all the outputs (i.e., no output is given before all inputs are presented). We can also naturally define the corresponding semiideal model, where the players can ideally and simultaneously (i.e., within a single round) evaluate several functions. Assume now that we have a semi-ideal protocol for some function which simultaneously evaluates functions , and let be a secure protocol for . Given an interleaving of the 's, we let denote the (real-model) protocol where we substitute the single ideal call to with real executions of the protocols interleaved according to . As apparent from Example 2, we cannot hope that every interleaving will be "good," that is, will yield a SFE protocol for . (For instance, in the semi-ideal coin-flipping protocol of Example 2, no matter how we design SFE protocols and for and , any sequential interleaving of and yields an insecure protocol.) Actually, the guaranteed existence of even a single good interleaving cannot be taken for granted, therefore:
Can we be guaranteed that there is always an interleaving of such that is a SFE protocol for ?
Of course, the answer to the above question should depend on the notion of SFE we are using. This leads us to the following informal definition.
Definition 2:
We say that a SFE notion satisfies synchronous reducibility if, whenever the protocols satisfy this SFE notion, there exists an interleaving such that is a SFE protocol under this notion.
Example 2 not only shows that there are bad interleavings, but also that a "liberal" enough definition of SFE will not satisfy synchronous reducibility. Indeed, according to the SFE notions of [7, 2, 16] , the protocol consisting of player sending to player is a secure protocol for . Similarly, the protocol consisting of player sending to player is a secure protocol for . However, there is no interleaving of and that will result in a secure coin-flip. This is because the last player to send its bit (which includes the case when the players exchange their bits in one round, due to the "rushing" ability of the adversary; see Section 2) is completely controlling the outcome. Thus, this example shows that the SFE notions of [7, 2, 16] do not support synchronous reducibility. However, we show 3 Theorem 2: The SFE notion of Micali and Rogaway [22] satisfies synchronous reducibility.
Theorem 2 actually has a quite constructive nature. Namely, the nature of the definition in [22] not only guarantees that "good" interleavings always exist, but also that there are many of them, that they are easy to find, and that some of them produce efficient protocols. We summarize the last property in the following corollary.
Corollary 2:
With respect to the Micali-Rogaway definition of SFE, let be an ideal protocol for that simultaneously calls the functions , and let be an -round SFE protocol for . Then there exists (an easy to find) interleaving of the 's, consisting of rounds, such that is secure.
In other words, independent on the number of sub-protocols, we can synchronously interleave them using at most twice as many rounds as the longest of them takes. 4 Let us remark that, unlike Corollary 1 (that simply follows from the definition of concurrent reducibility), Corollary 2 crucially depends on the very notion of [22] , as is discussed more in Section 4.3.
In Sum
We have clarified the notion of parallel reducibility, distilled two important flavors of it, and showed that there exist SFE notions (e.g., the one of [22] ) as well as general SFE protocols (e.g., the one of [5] ) that satisfy (both forms of) parallel reducibility. Theorems 1 and 2 (and their corollaries) do not necessarily imply that the definition of [22] is "preferable" to other others. If the protocol one is designing is simple enough or is unlikely to be composed in parallel with other protocols, other definitions are equally adequate (and may actually be simpler to use). It is, however, crucial to understand which SFE notions yield parallel reducibility if we want to simplify the complex task of designing secure computation protocols.
The Micali-Rogaway Definition of SFE
Consider a probabilistic function (where ). We wish to define a protocol for computing that is secure against any adversary that is allowed to corrupt in a dynamic fashion up to (out of ) players. 5 
Protocols and Adversaries
Protocol: An -party protocol is a tuple where is a collection of interactive probabilistic Turing machines that interact in synchronous rounds.
-the last round of (a fixed integer, for simplicity).
-the committal round (a fixed integer, for simplicity).
-the effective-input function, a computable function from strings to strings.
-the effective-output function, a computable function from strings to strings.
-a (probabilistic) function being allegedly computed.
Adversary:
An adversary is a probabilistic algorithm.
Executing and :
Adversary interacts with protocol as a traditional adaptive adversary in the rushing model. Roughly, this is explained below.
The execution of with an adversary proceeds as follows. Initially, each player has an input (for ) and an auxiliary input , while has an auxiliary input . (Auxiliary inputs represent any a-priori information known to the corresponding party like the history of previous protocol executions. An honest player should ignore , but might be useful later to the adversary.) At any point during the execution of , is allowed to corrupt some player (as long as corrupts no more than players overall). By doing so, learns the entire view of (i.e., , , 's random tape, and all the messages sent and received by ) up to this point input. From now on, can completely control the behavior of and thus make deviate from in any malicious way. At the beginning of each round, first learns all the messages sent from currently good players to the corrupted ones. 6 Then can adaptively corrupt several players, and only then does he send the messages from bad players to good ones. Without loss of generality, never sends a message from a bad player to another bad player.
At the end of , the view of , denoted consists of , 's random coins and the views of all the corrupted players. The traffic of a player up to round consists of all the messages received and sent by up to round . Such traffic is denoted traffic (or by traffic whenever we wish to stress the protocol and the adversary executing with it).
Effective Inputs and Outputs of a Real Execution:
In an execution of with , the effective input of player (whether good or bad), denoted , is determined at the committal round by evaluating the effective-input function on 's traffic at round : traffic . The effective output of player , denoted , is determined from 's traffic at the last round via the effective output function : traffic . Note that, for now, the effective inputs and outputs are unrelated to computing .
History of a Real Execution:
We let the history of a real execution, denoted , to be . Intuitively, the history contains all the relevant information of what happened when attacked the protocol : the view of , i.e. what he "learned", and the effective inputs and outputs of all the players.
Simulators and Adversaries
Simulator: A simulator is a probabilistic, oracle-calling, algorithm .
Executing with : Let be an adversary for a protocol for function . In an execution of with , there are no real players and there is no real network. Instead, interacts with in a round-by-round fashion, playing the role of all currently good players in an execution of with the real network, i.e.: (1) (makes up and) sends to a view of a player immediately after corrupts , (2) sends to the messages of currently good players to currently bad players 7 and (3) receives the messages sent by (on behalf of the corrupted players) to currently good players. In performing these tasks, makes use of the following oracle 8 :
Before . When a player is corrupted by before the committal round, immediately sends the input values and . In particular, uses these values in making up the view of .
At
. At the end of the committal round , sends the value traffic for each corrupted player . 9 In response, randomly selects a string , sets for all currently good players , computes , and for each corrupted player sends back to .
After
. When a player is corrupted by after the committal round, immediately sends the input values and , as well as the computed value . In particular, uses these values in making up the view of .
We denote by the view of when interacting with (using ).
Effective Inputs and Outputs of a Simulated Execution:
Consider an execution of (using oracle ) with adversary . Then, the effective inputs of this execution consist of the above defined values . Namely, if a player is corrupted before the committal round , then its effective input is traffic ; otherwise ( is never corrupted, or is corrupted after the committal round) its effective input is . The effective outputs are the values defined above. Namely, . 7 Notice that does not (and cannot) produce the messages from good players to good players. 8 Such oracle is meant to represent the trusted party in an ideal evaluation of . Given this oracle, 's goal is making believe that it is executing in a real network in which the players have inputs and auxiliary inputs . 9 Here traffic traffic of a corrupted player denotes what "thinks" the traffic of after round is.
History of a Simulated Execution:
We let the history of a simulated execution, denoted , to be . Intuitively, the history contains all the relevant information of what happened when was communicating with (and ): the view of , i.e. what he "learned", and the effective inputs and outputs of all the players.
Secure Computation
Definition 3: An -party protocol is a SFE protocol resilient against -restricted adversaries that computes a probabilistic -input/ -output function , if there exists a simulator such that for any input , auxiliary input , and any -restricted adversary with some auxiliary input , the histories of the real and the simulated executions are identically distributed: (1) Equivalently, .
Simulators and Oracles vs. Ideal Adversaries.
A standard benchmark in determining if a SFE notion is "reasonable" is the fact that for every real adversary there exists an "ideal adversary" that can produce (in the ideal model with the trusted party) the same view as got from the real network. 10 We argue that the existence of a simulator in the Micali-Rogaway definition indeed implies the existence of such an adversary . simply runs against the simulator . If corrupts a player before the committal round, corrupts in the ideal model, and gives the values and (that it just learned) to on behalf of the oracle . Right after the committal round of has been simulated by , computes from the traffic of the effective inputs of currently corrupted players , hands them to the trusted party, and returns the outputs of the corrupted players to on behalf of . Finally, if corrupts a player after the committal round, corrupts in the ideal model, and gives the values , and the output of (that it just learned) to on behalf of the oracle . At the end, simply outputs the resulting view of in the simulation. 11 We notice, however, that the "equivalent" ideal adversary implied by the definition of [22] is much more special than the possible ideal adversary envisaged by other definitions (e.g., [7] ). 12 
The Notion of Parallel Reducibility
First, let us define the semi-ideal model which generalizes the real model with the ability to ideally evaluate some functions. More precisely, in addition to regular rounds (where each player sends messages to other players), the semi-ideal model allows players to have ideal rounds. In such a round, the players can simultaneously evaluate several functions using a trusted third party. More specifically, at the beginning of this round each player gives the -tuple of his inputs to a trusted party. At the end of the round, each player gets back from the trusted party the corresponding -tuple of outputs. (Note, these -tuples are parts of players' traffic.)
The Micali-Rogaway definition of security of a protocol in the semi-ideal model is the same as that of a real model protocol with the following addition:
The simulator has to simulate all the ideal rounds as well, since they are part of what the adversary expects. has to do this using no special " -oracle". In other words, given the -inputs of corrupted 10 In fact, this requirement is more or less the SFE definition of [7] . 11 The construction of intuitively explains the definition of effective inputs and effective outputs of the simulated execution, as they are exactly the inputs/outputs in the run of in the ideal model. 12 For instance, such is constrained to run only once and in a black-box manner.
players in an ideal round, has to generate the corresponding outputs of corrupted players and give them back to . Also, when corrupts a player , has to produce on its own the -inputs/outputs of player during all the ideal rounds that happened so far (as these are parts of 's traffic, and therefore 's view).
Let be a SFE protocol for in the semi-ideal model, and let us fix our attention on any particular ideal round that evaluates some functions . We say that the ideal round is order-independent if for any sequential ordering of , semi-ideal protocol remains secure if we replace the ideal round with ideal rounds evaluating a single at a time in the order given by (we denote this semi-ideal protocol by ). Let be SFE protocols for . We would like to substitute the ideal calls to 's with the corresponding protocols 's and still get a secure protocol for . As we informally argued before, there are many ways to substitute (or to interleave) the 's, which is made precise by the following definition.
Definition 4:
An interleaving of protocols is any schedule of their execution. Namely, a single round of an interleaving may execute in parallel one round of one or more 's with the only restriction that the rounds of each are executed in the same order as they are in . A synchronous interleaving of protocols with committal rounds is any interleaving such that for any , round of strictly precedes round of . We call the place after all the "pre-committal" rounds but before all the "post-committal" rounds the synchronization point of . Given an interleaving of , we let be a protocol obtained by substituting the ideal round with the execution of the protocols in the order specified by . The committal round of , its effective input and output functions are defined in a straightforward manner from those of and . More specifically, given the traffic of in , we replace all 's traffic inside (if any) with the effective inputs and outputs of in , and apply the corresponding effective input/output function of to the resulting traffic. We also remark that when we run , we let the auxiliary input of player to be its view of the computation so far.
The fundamental question addressed by parallel reducibility is
Assuming are SFE protocols, under which conditions is a SFE protocol as well?
We highlight two kinds of sufficient conditions: (1) special properties of the protocol making secure irrespective of (which will lead us to concurrent reducibility), and (2) restrictions on the interleaving such that mere security of and is enough (which will lead us to synchronous reducibility). The following Main Theorem restates Theorem 1 and 2 of the introduction.
Parallel-Reducibility Theorem:
Consider the SFE notion of Micali-Rogaway. Let be a semi-ideal SFE protocol for evaluating in an ideal round ; let be a SFE protocol for ; and let be an interleaving of . Then is a SFE protocol for if either of the following conditions holds:
1. (Concurrent-Reducibility Theorem) is an order-independent round of . 2. (Synchronous-Reducibility Theorem) is a synchronous interleaving.
As we argued in the introduction, if we want to be secure for all , round must be order-independent. Thus, Micali-Rogaway definition achieves the strongest form of concurrent reducibility. On the other, hand, we also argued that if we do not put any extra conditions on and (aside from being SFE protocols), not all interleavings necessarily result in a SFE protocol. In fact, we showed that under a "too liberal" definition of SFE (which includes all SFE definitions other than Micali-Rogaway), it could be that no interleaving will result in a secure protocol . The stringent definition of Micali-Rogaway (in particular, the existence of a committal round) not only shows that such an interleaving must exist, but also allows us to define a rich class of interleavings which guarantee the security of : the only thing we require is that all the "pre-committal" rounds precede all the "post-committal" rounds. In other words, players should first "declare" all their inputs to 's, and only then proceed with the "actual computation" of any of the 's. The intuition behind this restriction is clear: this is exactly what happens in the semi-ideal model when players simultaneously evaluate in .
Remark 1:
In the parallel-reducibility theorem we do not allow the adversary choose the interleaving adaptively in the process of the computation. This is only done for simplicity. For example, synchronous reducibility will hold provided the adversary is restricted to select a synchronous interleaving . And concurrent reducibility holds if the semi-ideal protocol remains secure if we allow the semi-ideal adversary adaptively order the ideal calls to .
Proof of the Parallel-Reducibility Theorem
For economy and clarity of presentation, we shall prove both concurrent and synchronous reducibility "as together as possible". Let be the simulator for , let be the order of committal rounds of the 's in the interleaving (if several committal rounds of 's happen in one round, order them arbitrarily), and let be the simulator for . We need to construct the simulator for . The proofs for the concurrent and synchronous reducibility are going to be very similar, the main differences being the following: Concurrent Reducibility. Since is an order-independent round of , the protocol is also secure, i.e. has a simulator . We will use instead of (together with ) in constructing . In particular, will simulate the ideal call to right after the committal round of , which is exactly the order given by . Synchronous Reducibility. Here we must use itself. In particular, at some point will have to simulate the simultaneous ideal call to , and expects to see the inputs of the corrupted players. Since the interleaving is a synchronous interleaving, it has a synchronization point where all the effective inputs of the corrupted players are defined before any of the 's went on "with the rest of the computation." It is at this point where we let simulate the ideal call, because we will be able to provide with all the (effective) inputs.
To simplify matters, we can assume without loss of generality that each round of executes one round of a single . Indeed, if we can construct a simulator for any such interleaving, we can do it for any interleaving executing in one round a round of several 's: arbitrarily split this round into several rounds executing a single and use the simulator for this new interleaving to simulate the original interleaving. 13 
The Simulator
As we will see in Section 4.2, the actual proof will construct in stages, that is, will construct simulators , where will be . However, we present the final right away because it provides a good intuition of why the proof "goes through" (but can be skipped otherwise).
For concreteness, we concentrate on the concurrent reducibility case. As one can expect, simply runs and uses to simulate the interleaving of .
Run up to round (can do it since and are the same up to round ). Tell each to corrupt all the players already corrupted by the adversary (it is irrelevant what we give to as their inputs). Assume we execute some round of protocol in the interleaving . then uses to produce the needed messages from good-to-bad players and gives back to the response of the adversary. Right after the committal round of has been simulated, use the effective input function of and the traffic of the adversary in the simulation of to determine the effective input of each corrupted player to . We notice that at this stage is exactly waiting to simulate the ideal call to for the adversary. So gives the effective inputs as the adversary's inputs to , and learns from the output of each corrupted player . We notice that after round has been simulated, the simulator expects to see the outputs of all the corrupted players from the -oracle that does not exist in our simulation. Instead, we give the values that we just learned from . We keep running the above simulation up to the end of the interleaving . We note that at this stage has just finished simulating the ideal calls to all the 's, and waits to keep the simulation of starting from round . And we just let do it intil the end of (we can do it since and are the same again from this stage). It remains to describe how handles the corruption requests of the adversary. This will depend on where in the corruption request happens. But in any case tells that the adversary asked to corrupt player and learns from the view of in (the simulation of) .
If the corruption request happens before round , simply return to the adversary. Otherwise, the adversary expects to see (possibly partial) transcript of inside every , which does not contain. However, still contains the supposed inputs of player to each . For each we now ask the simulator to corrupt player in order to learn its view inside . To answer this request, needs help from the -oracle (that does not exist in our simulation), which provides as follows. -If the corruption happened before the committal round , only expects to see the input and the auxiliary input of player to . We give him as the actual input and extract from the view of prior to round as 's auxiliary input.
-If the corruption happened after round , 14 also expects to see the output of player in . However, in this case such an output is also contained in , since right after the (already elapsed) round , we have simulated the ideal call to in . Thus, is part of 's view in , and as such should be included by in . We see that in any of the above two cases we can provide with the information it expects. Therefore, we get back the view of in so far. now simply combines with to get the final simulated view of , and gives it back to the adversary (we will argue later that the security of the 's implies that these views "match").
We remark that the simulator for synchronous reducibility is very similar. We essentially need to replace by and let simulate the single ideal call to at the synchronization point of , when the traffic of the adversary will simultaneously give the (effective) inputs of the corrupted players to all the 's.
Proof Outline
While we have already constructed the simulator , in the proof we will need to use the security of some particular . Therefore, we will need "to move slowly" from the assumed secure protocol or (evaluating all ideally) to the protocol (whose security we need to establish and which runs real protocols ). Roughly, we need to "eliminate" one ideal call (to some ) at a time, by "replacing" it with the protocol . Using the security of , we will then argue that this "substitution" still leaves the resulting protocol a SFE protocol for . To make the above idea more precise, we need some notation. 15 First, from the interleaving of , we define the "projection interleaving" (for each ). This is the interleaving of the protocols intermixed with the ideal calls to . More precisely, we remove from the rounds of all for . For concurrent reducibility, we add the ideal calls to (for every ) right after the place where we previously had the committal round of . We notice that this order of the ideal calls is consistent with the permutation . In particular, we will identify the "base" interleaving of with the permutation . For synchronous reducibility, we add a single ideal call to right at the synchronization point of , and still call the resulting interleaving of a synchronous interleaving. Notice that is also a "projection" of . Slightly abusing the notation, we now define (in a straighforward way) "intermediate" semi-ideal protocols , which essentially replace the ideal calls to with (but leave the ideal calls to ). We note that and is either (the concurrent case) or (the synchronous case). We know by the assumption of the Theorem that is secure, and need to show that is secure. Naturally, we show it by induction by showing that the security of implies that of . Not surprisingly, this will follow from the security of .
To summarize, the only thing we need to establish is the following. Assume is a SFE protocol for with the simulator . We need to construct a simulator for such that for all inputs of the players and for any adversary in , we get . We construct from and the simulator for . Essentially, will run in and use (together with 's simulation of the ideal call to ) to answer the adversary inside . In the "other direction", given adversary in , we define the adversary in . This adversary will run in , and will also use (together with the ideal call to in ) to interact with inside . Informally, we will say that " " and "
". The assumed security of implies that . Since essentially runs , the history of in will naturally "contain" (we define it precisely later) the history of run against and the simulator . We denote this history by . Then the above equality of histories, combined with the definition of , will immediately imply that . What will remain to show is that . We remark that the "environments" and are identical except the former runs the actual protocol , while the latter evaluates ideally and uses the simulator to deal with inside . Not surprisingly, the last equality (whose verification is the main technical aspect of the proof) will follow from the security of . Namely, assuming that the last equality is false, we will construct an adversary for such that , a contradiction. Roughly, will simulate the whole network of players in (both the adversary and the honest players!), except when executing .
This completes a brief outline of the proof. The full proof can be found in the Appendix.
The Definitional Support of Parallel Reducibility
Since at least synchronous reducibility provably does not hold for other SFE definitions, one may wonder what specific features of the definition of [22] are "responsible" for parallel reducibility. While such key features can be properly appreciated only from the full proof of the parallel-reducibility theorem, we can already informally highlight two such features on the basis of the above proof outline.
On-line Simulatability:
The simulator not only is universal (i.e., independent of the adversary ) and not only interacts with in a black-box manner, but must also interact with "on-line". In other words, runs with only once: each time that sends a piece of information to , this piece becomes part of 's final view. This is in contrast with traditional simulators, which would be allowed to interact with arbitrarily many times, to "rewind" in the middle of an execution, and to produce any string they want as 's entire view. The ability to generate 's final view on-line is probably the most crucial for achieveing any kind of parallel reducibility. For example, an adversary of the composed protocol might base it actions in subprotocol depending on what it sees in sub-protocol and vice versa. Therefore, the resulting views of inside and are very inter-dependent. It thus appears crucial that, in order to simulate these interdependent views, the simulator for should be capable of extending 's view inside incrementally "in small pieces" (as it happens with 's view in the real execution) that should never "be taken back". If, instead, one were only guaranteed that he could simulate the entire (as opposed to "piece-by-piece") view of in each separately, there is no reason to expect that these two separate views would be as interdependent as can make them in the real model. As demonstrated in Section 4.1, on the other hand, having on-line "one-pass" simulation makes it very easy to define the needed on-line simulator for .
Committal Rounds: Intuitively, the committal round corresponds to the "synchronization point" in the ideal function evaluation: when all the players have sent their inputs to the trusted party, but have not received their corresponding outputs yet. Not surprisingly, the notion of the committal round plays such a crucial role in synchronous reducibility. In particular, the very existence of "good" interleavings (i.e., synchronous interleaving, as stated in Theorem 2) is based on the committal rounds. Committal rounds also play a crucial role in Corollary 2. Indeed, the greedy concurrent execution of all the "pre-committal" rounds of any number of sub-protocols (which takes at most rounds), followed by the greedy concurrent execution of all the "post-committal" rounds of (which also takes at most rounds), yields a synchronous interleaving of with the claimed number of rounds.
The Price of Parallel Reducibility. The definitional support of parallel reducibility "comes at a price": it rules out some reasonable protocols from being called secure. For example, having simply send to is not a secure protocol (in the sense of [22] ) for the function of Example 2. Indeed, assume adversary corrupts player before the protocol starts and does not corrupt anyone else later on. Then will learn in the real execution. Therefore, for the simulator to match the view of , it must also send to in round . For doing so, must learn from its oracle before round . Since does not corrut player , this can only happen when learns the output of corrupted player (which is indeed ) after the committal round. Unfortunately, the committal round is round itself, because only then does manifest its input via its own message traffic. Thus, will learn only after round , which is too late.
In sum, a reasonable protocol for function is excluded by the definition of [22] from being secure, but this "price" has a reason: Example 2 proves that such (individually) reasonable protocol is not synchronously reducible.
Full Proof of the Parallel-Reducibility Theorem
Here we give a full proof of the Paralle-Reducibility Theorem following the outline given in Section 4.2.
Recall that the only thing we had to prove was the following. Assume is a SFE protocol for with the simulator . We need to show that is a SFE protocol for as well. That is, we need to construct a simulator for such that for all inputs of the players and for any adversary in , we get . For concreteness, we concentrate on the concurrent reducibility case. With all the previous discussion, the proof for synchronous reducibility can be easily traced as well.
Simulator :
We construct from and the simulator for . Essentially, will run in and use (together with 's simulation of the ideal call to ) to answer the adversary inside . Informally, " ".
Run up to round (can do it since and are the same up to round ). Tell to corrupt all the players already corrupted by the adversary (it is irrelevant what we give to as their inputs). Unless in the interleaving we execute a round of (which we do not have in ), still use to answer the adversary (this includes a round of for , or the ideal call to for ). If we execute a round of in , use to answer. Right after the committal round of has been simulated, use the effective input function of and the traffic of the adversary in the simulation of to determine the effective input of each corrupted player to . We notice from the definition of the interleaving as a "projection" of the interleaving , that at this stage is exactly waiting to simulate the ideal call to for the adversary. So gives the effective inputs as the adversary's inputs to , and learns from the output of each corrupted player . We notice that after round has been simulated, the simulator expects to see the outputs of all the corrupted players from the -oracle that does not exist in our simulation. Instead, gives the values that it just learned from .
We keep running the above simulation up to the end of the interleaving . At this stage, we simply run (who just finished the simulation of ) until the end of (we can do it since and are the same again from this stage). It remains to describe how handles the corruption requests of the adversary. This will depend on where in the corruption request happens. But in any case tells that the adversary asked to corrupt player and learns from the view of in (the simulation of) . If the corruption request happens before round , simply return to the adversary. Otherwise, the adversary expects to see (possibly partial) transcript of inside , which does not contain. However, still contains the supposed inputs of player to . asks the simulator to corrupt player in order to learn its view inside . To answer this request, needs help from the -oracle (that does not exist in our simulation), which provides as follows.
-If the corruption happened before the committal round of , only expects to see the input and the auxiliary input of player to . We give him as the actual input and extract from the view of prior to round as 's auxiliary input.
-If the corruption happened after round (including the case when it happened after "the end" of ), also expects to see the output of player in . However, in this case such an output is also contained in the , since right after the (already elapsed) round , we have simulated the ideal call to in . Thus, is part of 's view in , and as such should be included by in . We see that in any of the above two cases we can provide with the information it expects. Therefore, gets back the view of in so far. now simply combines with to get the final simulated view of , and gives it back to the adversary (we will argue later that the security of implies that these views "match"). Now assume we are given any adversary for . In order to argue that , we need to define a corresponding adversary in .
Adversary
: This adversary will run in , and will also use (together with the ideal call to in ) to interact with inside . Informally, we will say that " ". Not surprisingly, the description of is almost word-for-word the description of the simulator , but "turned the other way around".
Run
up to round in (can do it since and are the same up to round ). Tell to corrupt all the players already corrupted by the (it is irrelevant what we give to as their inputs). Unless in the interleaving we execute a round of (which we do not have in ), still run in (this includes a round of for , or the ideal call to for ). If we execute a round of in , use to answer to , but do nothing in . Right after the committal round of has been simulated, use the effective input function of and the traffic of in the simulation of to determine the effective input of each corrupted player to . We notice from the definition of the interleaving as a "projection" of the interleaving , that at this stage the protocol is just about to execute the ideal call to and waits for to provide the inputs of the corrupted players. So provides the effective inputs it just extracted from the trafic of , and learns the output of each corrupted player .
We notice that after round has been simulated, the simulator expects to see the outputs of all the corrupted players from the -oracle. Instead,
gives the values that it just learned from the ideal call to . We keep running the above simulation up to the end of the interleaving . At this stage, we simply run in until the end of the protocol (we can do it since and are the same again from this stage). It remains to describe how handles the corruption requests of . This will depend on where in (the simulation of) the corruption request happens. But in any case corrupts the corresponding player in and learns the view of . If the corruption request happens before round , simply return to . Otherwise, expects to see (possibly partial) transcript of inside , which does not contain. However, still contains the supposed inputs of player to each . asks the simulator to corrupt player in order to learn its view inside . To answer this request, needs help from the -oracle, which provides as follows. -If the corruption happened before the committal round , only expects to see the input and the auxiliary input of player to . We give him as the actual input and extract from the view of prior to round as 's auxiliary input.
-If the corruption happened after round , also expects to see the output of player in . However, in this case such an output is also contained in the , since right after the (already elapsed) round , we have made the ideal call to in . Thus, is part of 's view in , and can be provided to as well. We see that in any of the above two cases we can provide with the information it expects. Therefore, gets back the view of in so far. now simply combines with to get the final simulated view of , and gives it back to (we will argue later that the security of the 's implies that these views "match").
Equality of Distributions:
From the security of , we know that (2) which is the same as
We notice that the view of (both against and ) actually contains the view of the adversary that was running in the background. We denote these views by and , and let def (4) def (5) Thus, Equation (2) (i.e., assumed security of ) implies that (6) However, from the definition of and the definitions of the effective inputs/outputs of based on those of , we observe that the latter distribution is syntactically the same as ! That is,
Therefore, Equation (6) and Equation (7) imply that what remains to prove is that
The Last Piece: We finally show Equation (8) . We remark that the "environments" and are identical except the former runs the actual protocol , while the latter evaluates ideally and uses the simulator to deal with inside . We call the first experiment the "real" experiment and the second -the "simulated" experiment. Assume that Equation (8) it is false for some input configuration . Let and on the configuration . Thus, . We notice that the overall randomness generating the histories of the real and the simulated experiments is identical except the real experiment uses the coins of the honest players inside (which do not depend on anything else as players are supposed to use brand new randomness inside a sub-routine), while the simulated experiment uses the randomness of the simulator and the -oracle executing the ideal call in (which again do not depend on anything else; call them ). Since , there exists a particular setting of all the other randomness except for and (this includes the randomness of , of all the honest players everywhere but in , all the trusted parties for where ) such that . We let be the auxiliary string of the adversary for that we will construct. We notice that determines the entire (identical) state of the real and simulated experiments up to round ; in particular, set of players currently corrupted by , and fixed inputs and auxiliary inputs of all currently honest players to . Since will immediately corrupt players in and ignore their inputs, their inputs to will not be relevant to get the contradiction, so the initial configuration for where will successfully run can be thought as . Here is the description of for . As we said, it starts from corrupting players in and ignoring their inputs. Then it simply keeps running against the entire network of honest players in (i.e, simulating both, which can do because it has and ) except for the run of inside , where actually uses the network available to him. When the running of inside is completed, knows the view of inside , and it also simulated completely in its mind the run of in the interleaving . Now wants to continue running in its mind the interaction of with the honest players for the rest of . For that, it needs to know the outputs of honest players in . To "get them", samples uniformly a consistent randomness of honest players inside that would have produced the view that the adversary got inside (note, this step is not polynomial time, but we do not care). Here we use the fact that are supposed to be brand new random coins independent of everything else, and never used by honest players upon the termination of . Having sampled , can simply deterministically finish the run of (as it knows , and ). Having done so, stops. We see that embedded in the view of is the view of that ran in the background. We notice that when interacts with the real network , this view of , and in fact the entire "history" of this run of (its view we got from and the effective inputs and outputs of of all the players, assuming honest players used randomness inside ), is identically the same as . Indeed, it does not matter if honest players sampled from the beginning at random and used it, or that we let honest players sample random , got the history of , sampled random consistent with this history, and pretend the honest players actually used . Now assume that we run against . Up to the completion of the interleaving, the entire "history" of the run of we got from is syntactically the same that when we run it against . However, when we finish the interleaving, a tricky thing happens. In the first case, we interpret the run of against as if honest players executed , and sample random consistent randomness of honest players. In the second case, we just give players their effective outputs from the trusted party, and generate the actual randomness of player using , but only if corrupts later. If we argue that the latter two processes are indeed identical (i.e. it is OK to sample random consistent when is run against ), we would be done obtaining a contradiction. We need to use a somewhat elaborate argument for that, which we semi-informally sketch.
We emphasize again the experiments that we need to compare: We know from the security of that the Experiments 1. and 2. are identical "all the way" (if not, we are done getting a contradiction, as they correspond to the runs of against and ). We also know that Experiments 2. and 3. are syntactically the same up to the end of the interleaving . We assumed that Experiment 1. and 3. are "different" (in their entirety). To still get a contradiction we show by extending the argument "one-round-at-a-time" that Experiments 2. and 3. must be identical "all the way" as well. For that we will use the universality of the simulator , i.e. that it "does not know" which adversary it is talking to.
Assume we established up to round that Experiments 2. and 3. are the same. The starting is the end of the interleaving, where we know this is the case. We also know from this, that the effective outputs of honest players in are distributed the same in Experiments 2. and 3. If in round the adversary does not corrupt any player, we are done, since honest players do not use their randomness they used inside , only their inputs and outputs, which we know are distributed the same. The only problem is when corrupts a player. In Experiment 2. we return the (consistent) value that we sampled at the end of the interleaving. In Experiment 3. we let the simulator generate this randomness. However, we still argue that these two answers are distributed in the same way (conditioned on what happened before). In particular, assume so far has corrupted players after the end of the interleaving (so that ). could base its decisions to corrupt these players on some powerful information it extracted since the end of the interleaving.
However, the simulator is universal and has to answer in the same way no matter why asked to corrupt these players. In particular, there exists an adversary that does the same thing as up to the end of the run of inside the interleaving, and then for "no specific reason" asks to corrupt the same players . Since cannot distinguish between these two cases (it only sees the requests of whom to corrupt), its responses must be the same as well. But when the adversary asks to corrupt these players "for no reason" right at the end of the interleaving, the security of (against this ) implies that the answers that gives are distributed exactly the same as the true randomness of the actual players conditioned on the view got inside , which are exactly the answers we sampled in Experiment 2.! This shows that Experiments 2. and 3. are indeed the same, Experiments 1. and 2. are the same, and yet we assumed that Experiments 1. and 3. are different, a contradiction.
